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PROCEEDINGS  
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ABSTRACT: 
This article addresses, from a Scottish viewpoint, the implications of Brexit for cross-border 
divorce proceedings. It sets out the background to Brexit, and outlines the import of the Repeal 
Bill for private international law rules concerning matrimonial proceedings. The current 
constitutional position within the United Kingdom with regard to private international law is 
explored, and the existing law on cross-border divorce, as it applies to the different types of 
divorce proceedings which present in British courts, explained. The mapping of existing rules 
serves as an introduction to the main purpose of the article, which is to speculate and advise on 
post-Brexit regulation of cross-border matrimonial proceedings. To this end, the authors 
present a fictional dialogue which discusses the effect of converting Brussels II bis into UK 
law as part of the transfer of the acquis communitaire, and debates the respective merits, for 
the longer term, of the UK Government’s seeking to negotiate with the EU an agreement on 
private international law matters guaranteeing reciprocity, or of refining existing private 
international law rules contained in the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 and 
the Family Law Act 1986, so as to cater for ‘EU divorces’ in the same way as ‘non-EU’, 
international divorces.  
 
KEY WORDS: Brexit, cross-border divorce, Great Repeal Bill, Repeal Bill, private 
international law, Brussels II bis, Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, Family 
Law Act 1986. 
 
  
IPL – Brexit and Family Law (Cambridge) (CFLQ – SUBMISSION – Final Approved Submission – 28 June 
2017) 
2 
 
DIVORCING EUROPE: REFLECTIONS FROM A SCOTTISH PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT FOR CROSS-BORDER DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGSǂ 
Janeen M Carruthers* and Elizabeth B Crawford**  
Introduction 
The title ‘divorcing Europe’ has two meanings. It refers, on one interpretation, to the mechanics 
of cross-border divorce issues, but clearly, in another sense, encompasses the larger situation 
concerning the political, legal and economic implications of the United Kingdom’s divorce 
from the European Union, in which, it must be remembered, the UK is the petitioner. The 
European Union did not initiate divorce proceedings, nor even anticipate them, despite the fact 
that the UK, in the context of the process of the Europeanisation of private international law, 
became known for seeking, and receiving, special treatment; the marriage was not without its 
trouble.  
In examining the subject of cross-border divorce, this article is concerned solely with the status 
aspects of matrimonial causes, principally matters of jurisdiction and recognition of decrees of 
divorce, annulment and judicial separation. It does not address issues of the validity of a 
marriage, nor financial provision on divorce, or property and maintenance consequences.  
Since 2001 there has been in place among Member States of the European Union, by virtue of 
Regulation 1347/2000 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses 
(colloquially known as ‘Brussels II’),1 a system of allocation of jurisdiction and decree 
recognition in matrimonial matters. Brussels II was succeeded rapidly by Council Regulation 
2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (‘Brussels II bis’),2 which came into 
                                                          
ǂ This article derives from a paper which the authors were invited to deliver at ‘Brexit and Family Law’, a joint 
conference of Cambridge Family Law and the Child & Family Law Quarterly, at Trinity College, Cambridge in 
March 2017. The authors were asked to comment from a Scottish viewpoint, and the resultant speech and this 
article adopt that perspective. The article does not address specialties pertaining to Northern Ireland or Wales.  
 
* Professor of Private Law, University of Glasgow 
** Professor Emeritus of International Private Law and Honorary Research Fellow, University of Glasgow 
1 OJ [2000] L160/19.  
2 Council Regulation (EC) No.2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No.1347/2000 
(variously known as BIIa, and BII revised, but referred to hereinafter as ‘Brussels II bis’). 
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force on 1 March 2005. Brussels II bis created a single European instrument securing the free 
movement of matrimonial judgments and parental responsibility judgments, directly applicable 
among all European Member States, except Denmark.3  
In relation to matrimonial proceedings, the core provisions of Brussels II bis are contained in 
arts 3 (general jurisdiction), 19 (lis pendens and dependent actions), 21 (recognition of a 
judgment) and 22 (grounds of non-recognition). By art 3, matters relating to divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of the Member State: 
‘(a) in whose territory: - the spouses are habitually resident, or - the spouses were last habitually 
resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or - the respondent is habitually resident, or 
- in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or - the applicant 
is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the 
application was made, or - the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at 
least six months immediately before the application was made, and is either a national of the 
Member State in question or, in the case of the UK and Ireland, has his or her ‘domicile’ there;4 
(b) of the nationality of both spouses or, in the case of the UK and Ireland, of the ‘domicile’ of 
both spouses.’ Article 19 establishes a rule of priority of process, in terms of which, where 
proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment between the same 
parties are brought before the courts of different Member States, the court second seised shall 
of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised 
is established.  In terms of art 21, a judgment given in an EU Member State shall be recognised 
in the other Member States without any special procedure being required; in particular, no 
special procedure is required for updating the ‘civil-status records’ of a Member State, on the 
final award of a judgment from another Member State. However, any interested party may 
apply for a decision that the judgment be or be not recognised. The grounds of non-recognition 
are very limited: a judgment relating to a divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment shall 
not be recognised: (a)  if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
Member State in which recognition is sought; (b) where it was given in default of appearance, 
if the respondent was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with 
an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the respondent to 
                                                          
3 Protocol No.22 on the position of Denmark (consolidated versions of the TEU and the TFEU [2008] OJ 
C115/299), in terms of which Denmark shall not take part in the adoption of proposed measures pursuant t o 
Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
4 In terms of art.3.2, for the purposes of Brussels II bis, ‘domicile’ shall have the same meaning as it has under 
the legal systems of the UK and Ireland. 
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arrange for his or her defence unless it is determined that the respondent has accepted the 
judgment unequivocally; (c) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in proceedings 
between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought; or (d) if it is 
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a non-Member 
State between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the Member State in which recognition is sought. 
Brussels II bis is currently in course of review and revisal.5 Notably, the changes proposed 
concern parental responsibility matters, and not matrimonial proceedings. The UK 
Government, by decision of 5 October 2016, advised that the UK is participating in the 
recasting exercise,6 which, at the time of writing, is ongoing.  
Brussels II bis forms merely one area of the cross-border, European legal landscape, part of the 
‘Brussels regime’ of European private international law regulations concerning jurisdiction and 
enforcement of judgments, led by the Brussels I Recast Regulation on civil and commercial 
matters.7 
The question to be examined here is whether or not the existing UK residual national rules of 
jurisdiction, and rules of recognition of judgments presently in use in UK courts in cross-
border, non-EU matrimonial proceedings can serve in future in all cases (i.e. without 
geographical limitation), or whether the better policy will be for the UK Government to 
negotiate with the European Union to seek to deliver a Brussels II bis simulacrum.  
 
The political background 
Many position papers have been published on the subject of the UK’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, beginning with Prime Minister Theresa May’s Lancaster House speech of 17 
                                                          
5 European Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast) {SWD(2016) 207 final} {SWD(2016) 208 final} (Brussels, 30.6.2016 COM(2016) 411 final 2016/0190 
(CNS)). 
6 Statement by Sir Oliver Heald, Minister of State for Courts and Justice, in House of Commons on 27 October 
2016 (WSHCWS225), and corrected statement made on 16 December 2016 (HCWS375). See also st atement made 
by Lord Keen of Elie (Lords Spokesperson, Ministry of Justice), in House of Lords on 27 October 2016 
(HLWS225), and corrected statement made on 19 December 2016 (HLWS378).  
7 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (‘Brussels 
I Recast’) OJ L 351, 20 December 2012, pp 1–32. 
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January 2017, which set out the UK Government’s plan for the Brexit negotiations.8 This 
speech was swiftly followed by the Government White Paper, ‘The UK’s exit from and new 
partnership with the European Union’.9 Subsequently, of particular relevance to the topic of 
family law, two parliamentary Committee reports were published, namely, the House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 17th Report of Session 2016/17, ‘Brexit: justice for families, 
individuals and businesses?’,10 and the House of Commons Justice Committee, 9th Report of 
Session 2016/17, ‘Implications of Brexit for the Justice System’.11   
Upon notification by the Prime Minister of the UK’s proposed withdrawal from the European 
Union, by means of notice to the President of the European Council on 29 March 2017 under 
article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the Department for Exiting the European Union 
published another White Paper, ‘Legislating for the UK’s Withdrawal from the European 
Union’,12 setting out the mechanism for repeal of the European Communities Act 1972, and 
introducing the legislative vehicle of the (Great13) Repeal Bill.  
On the European side, the counterweights by which to gauge the European approach to the 
withdrawal process and wider negotiations are the Council of the European Union’s ‘Draft 
Guidelines following the UK’s notification under Art 50 TEU’,14 published on 31 March 2017, 
and the speech delivered by Michel Barnier, EU Commission Chief Negotiator for the 
Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the UK, on 22 March 2017, on ‘The 
Conditions for Reaching an Agreement in the Negotiations with the UK’.  
 
The (Great) Repeal Bill 
The UK Government’s March 2017 White Paper set out the Government’s plan to convert the 
‘acquis’ – the body of existing EU law – into British law, with the objective of providing 
‘maximum certainty as we leave the EU. The same rules and laws will apply on the day after 
                                                          
8https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-
speech. See section 2 (‘Control of our own laws’). 
9 Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt Hon David Davis MP (CM 9417) (2 February 2017). 
10 HL Paper 134 (20 March 2017) (hereinafter ‘House of Lords Committee Report’). 
11 HC 750 (22 March 2017) (hereinafter ‘House of Commons Committee Report’). 
12 Department for Exiting the European Union (CM 9446) (March 2017) ( ‘March 2017 White Paper’). 
13 Initially designated the Great Repeal Bill, this Bill now is named simply the Repeal Bill: The Queen’s Speech 
and Associated Background Briefing on the Occasion of the Opening of Parliament on Wednesday 21 June 2017. 
See Introduction by Prime Minister Theresa May MP, at p 5; and, at pp 11 and 17, Her Majesty’s Most Gracious 
Speech to Both Houses of Parliament, Wednesday 21 June 2017.  
14 Brussels, 31 March 2017 (XT 21001/17). 
IPL – Brexit and Family Law (Cambridge) (CFLQ – SUBMISSION – Final Approved Submission – 28 June 
2017) 
6 
 
exit as on the day before. It will then be for democratically elected representatives in the UK 
to decide on any changes to that law, after full scrutiny and proper debate.’15 The March 2017 
White Paper states that the (Great) Repeal Bill ‘will convert directly-applicable EU laws into 
UK law’,16 and ‘will also preserve the laws we have made in the UK to implement our EU 
obligations.’17 In relation to matrimonial causes, the (Great) Repeal Bill is a political assurance 
that, on Brexit Day + 1, there will be no vacuum in British law insofar as ‘domesticated’ rules 
of jurisdiction and judgment recognition, modelled on Brussels II bis, will apply in UK courts. 
 
The constitutional position within the UK 
The legal systems of the UK have much in common in private international law,18 and with 
regard to the European harmonisation of laws agenda, from its inception, there has been 
harmony of attitude within the UK towards this ambitious programme. Using the word in its 
technical meaning, one can say that the UK attitude has been an ‘insular’ one, involving the 
main island and Northern Ireland. The metaphorical usage of the word is apt too, for the British 
approach has been one of measured assessment of the likely advantages and disadvantages of 
any proposed harmonisation initiative. The UK as a whole has had the invaluable benefit of the 
discretionary opt-in per Protocol 21 of the Lisbon Treaty on the position of the UK and Ireland 
in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice,19 allowing the UK Government to sift 
and weigh each legislative proposal and make a particularised decision to opt in or not to a 
given instrument concerning EU justice and home affairs measures.20 The result is that the UK, 
as it has transpired, has opted into all the main European private international law instruments 
concerning civil and commercial matters, but has been more selective and discriminating in 
relation to family and associated property and succession matters. The UK exercised the right 
                                                          
15 March 2017 White Paper, Foreword from the Prime Minister, p 5. 
16 Ibid, para 2.4. 
17 Ibid, para 2.5. 
18 EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W.Green, 4th edition, 2015), 
at para 2-04; and JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at p 10. 
19 [2008] OJ C115/295. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon the opt-in was provided by Protocol No.4 on the position of 
the UK and Ireland [1997] OJ C340/99. See also Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark (ex-Protocol No.5 
on the position of Denmark [1997] OJ C340/101), in terms of which Denmark shall not take part in the adoption 
of proposed measures pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
20 See, for detail, EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W.Green, 4th 
edition, 2015), para 1-08; L Collins (Gen ed.), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 
15th edition, 2012), para 11-015; and JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at p 204. 
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not to opt into such measures as Rome III,21 the Succession Regulation,22 the Regulation 
Establishing the Justice Programme (2014-2020),23 and the Matrimonial Property and 
Registered Partnership Property Regulations.24  
The privilege of discretionary opt-in to proposed instruments per Protocol No 21 is one 
extended not to individual legal systems of the UK, but rather to the UK as a whole, as the EU 
Member State.    
 
The position of Scotland within the UK in the matter of private international law 
Account must be taken of the fundamental constitutional change effected by the Scotland Act 
1998 (as amended), as a result of which matters of Scottish civil law fall within the legislative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament.25 Section 126(4)(a) interprets the civil law of Scotland 
as a reference to the general principles of private law, including private international law.26  
An Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law insofar as any provision thereof is outside the 
legislative competence of that Parliament; reserved matters are expressly excluded from its 
legislative competence. The question whether a provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament 
relates to a reserved matter is to be determined by reference to the purpose of the provision, 
having regard, inter alia, to its effect in all the circumstances.27 In case of dispute, final 
adjudication as to characterisation as devolved or reserved is for the UK Supreme Court.28 
                                                          
21 Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 implementing enhanced co-operation in the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation OJ L 343, 29 December 2010, pp 10–16. 
22 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of 
succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession OJ L 201, 27 July 2012, pp 107–134. 
23 Regulation (EU) No 1382/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing a Justice Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, OJ L 354, 28 December 2013, pp 73–83. 
24 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property 
regimes OJ L 183, 8 July 2016, pp 1–29; and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions 
in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships  OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, pp 30–56. 
25 Scotland Act 1998, s 29 (legislative competence) establishes what the Scottish Parliament may not do rather 
than what it may do. Section 29(2)(b) provides that reserved matters (in respect of which, see s 30, Sch 5) are 
outside Scottish Parliamentary competence. 
26 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 38 serves as an example of Holyrood utilisation of this competence.  
27 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(3). 
28 Scotland Act 1998, s 33. 
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Although international private law generally is a devolved matter falling within the legislative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament, the private international law aspects of reserved matters 
likewise are reserved.29 
By constitutional convention, it is possible for the UK Parliament, with consent of the Scottish 
Parliament, by legislative consent motion (previously a ‘Sewel motion’) to legislate for 
Scotland in devolved matters.  
In the context of the conflict of laws, particularly in family law, there may be perceivable 
benefits from having the UK Parliament legislate for the entire UK, thus lessening the 
likelihood of intra-UK conflict of laws problems. The resultant legislation may contain separate 
provision for each legal system within the UK, but, if that is the case, Parliament strives to 
ensure that the legislation demonstrates internal UK coherence.30 
In terms of section 57 of the Scotland Act 1998 (‘EU law and Convention rights’), despite the 
transfer to the Scottish Ministers of functions in relation to implementing obligations under EU 
law, any function of a Minister of the Crown in relation to any matter shall continue to be 
exercisable by him as regards Scotland for the purposes of section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972. In this context, therefore, there is ‘shared power’ between Scottish and 
UK Ministers. Furthermore, Schedule 5, Part 1, paragraph 7 of the 1998 Act reserves foreign 
affairs, including relations with the European Union, but excepting implementation of 
international obligations, obligations under the Human Rights Convention and obligations 
under EU law.31  
(a) The Repeal Bill and the Scottish devolution settlement 
The March 2017 White Paper indicates that, in parallel with the withdrawal negotiations, the 
UK Government will undertake discussions with the devolved administrations ‘to identify 
where common frameworks need to be retained in the future, what these should be, and where 
                                                          
29 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(4)(b). For example, international private law rules concerning intellectual property are 
reserved. 
30 By way of example, the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which affects reserved matters as well as devolved matters, 
was referred to Westminster by means of a Sewel motion. The Act, however, makes bespoke provision for the 
different legal systems within the UK. Compare the (pre-devolution) Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1984 Pt 3 (England) and Pt 4 (Scotland). 
31 Separate secondary implementing legislation frequently is required for Scotland and England, respectively, in 
respect of EU Regulations.  
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common frameworks covering the UK are not necessary.’32 The Government’s expectation is 
that the outcome of the Brexit process will deliver increased decision-making power to the 
devolved administrations. In particular, where a matter is devolved, the repatriation of powers 
will deliver to the devolved administrations the power to amend the law governing such matters 
where, after Brexit, an unamended law would no longer operate appropriately.33 This 
anticipated enlargement of powers could open up the possibility of increased divergence 
between the private international law of England and Wales, on the one hand, and that of 
Scotland, on the other.  In the authors’ view, marked divergence among the private international 
law rules of the legal systems of the UK – i.e. Scottish rules of private international law 
concerning (devolved) Scottish civil law differing from English rules – would be capable of 
destabilising the situation which currently obtains in conflict of laws matters within the UK, 
and the authors hope that the devolved administration in Scotland will not act so as to introduce 
significantly different measures than pertain under Westminster legislation.   
Since, by Part 5, paragraph 7(1) of the Scotland Act 1998, international relations, including 
relations with territories outside the UK, the European Union (and their institutions) and other 
international organisations, regulation of international trade, and international development 
assistance and co-operation will continue (in the absence of amending legislation) to be 
reserved matters, any ‘international relation’ or ‘international cooperation’ will be conducted, 
post-Brexit or in anticipation of Brexit, by the UK Government, albeit, it is hoped, fully 
informed by due consultation with interested parties/stakeholders as to the positions prevailing 
in the legal systems of the devolved administrations. While implementation of international 
obligations will continue to be a devolved matter, it may be assumed that the post-Brexit 
negotiation and drafting of any agreement to operate between one or more legal systems of the 
UK and European Union Member States will remain a reserved matter. 
(b) The Hague Conference on Private International Law and the position of Scotland 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an inter-governmental body, founded 
in 1893, dedicated to the harmonisation of the private international law rules of different legal 
systems, and the development and service of multilateral legal instruments. In 1955 the 
Conference was put on a statutory footing, and at the time of writing has 81 Member States 
                                                          
32 March 2017 White Paper, para 4.4. See, subsequently, The Queen’s Speech and Associated Background 
Briefing on the Occasion of the Opening of Parliament on Wednesday 21 June 2017, Her Majesty’s Most Gracious 
Speech to Both Houses of Parliament, Wednesday 21 June 2017, at pp 11 and 17–18. 
33 March 2017 White Paper, para 4.8. 
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from all continents and one Regional Economic Integration Organisation, namely, the 
European Union.34 Although the EU’s membership of the Hague Conference does not supplant 
the membership of individual EU Member States, shared competence in projects falling within 
the expanding EU remit means that participation by individual EU Member States in Hague 
Conference projects is correspondingly inhibited.  
The UK is, and post-Brexit will remain,35 the Hague Conference Contracting State. 
Nevertheless, on occasion, as a result of differences in the content of certain areas of the 
domestic law of Scotland and England, it may happen that the UK will sign a Hague 
Convention on behalf of one constituent legal system only. An example is the 2000 Hague 
Convention on International Protection of Adults, which was signed by the UK separately for 
Scotland and for England, and ratified only for Scotland on 5 November 2003. This is 
explicable because of the different legal backgrounds which obtained in Scots and English law, 
respectively.36    
More pressing is the extent to which Hague instruments to which the UK is a party only by dint 
of being a European Member State will operate post-Brexit, i.e. how the UK may extricate 
itself from the EU bloc and re-present as an individual Contracting State to any one or more 
Hague convention. In order for the UK to continue to have the benefit of such Hague 
instruments, it will be necessary, after agreement to that end has been struck between the UK 
and the EU, to ensure that there is no dissent by any other Contracting State which is party to 
the relevant convention, to the UK’s continuing status as a party bound by the instrument. 
Assuming no dissent, such an agreement could be lodged with the Convention depositary (the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands). A precedent is provided by 
the position of Hong Kong and Macao37 in relation to the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention.38 
                                                          
34 On 3 April 2007, the European Community was admitted to membership of the Hague Conference as a Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, and 
by Declaration of Succession, the European Union replaced and succeeded the EC as a member of the Conference 
from that date. 
35 Scotland Act 1998, Part 5, paragraph 7(1). 
36 The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 was enacted very early in the history of the Scottish Parliament, 
and was available to provide the implementing legislation for the 2000 Hague Convention in Scotland. The 
implementing legislation for England and Wales – the Mental Capacity Act 2005 – was not in existence at that 
point. As things stand, the Convention has not been ratified by the UK for England and Wales. 
37 See also the position of the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the ‘velvet revolution’ in Czechoslovakia.  
38 Agreement having been reached between the UK and the People’s Republic of China regarding the continuing 
operation of the 1980 Convention in Hong Kong and Macao following the UK’s 1997 transfer of sovereignty to 
the People’s Republic of China, a note was lodged with the Convention depositary, to the effect that the 
Convention would continue to apply for Hong Kong and Macao. The Hague Conference website st ates the date 
of entry into force of the Convention for Hong Kong as being 1 September 1997, and not the earlier date on which 
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In future, the UK, being excluded from regional European Union harmonisation measures, may 
be best advised to participate in international harmonisation initiatives by way of multilateral 
harmonisation instruments negotiated at the Hague Conference. The existence of Hague 
Conventions will assist post-Brexit in certain areas of family law (notably the laws concerning 
children,39 and maintenance40), but, while the overseas divorce recognition rules contained in 
the Family Law Act 1986 derive from the 1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations, there is no modern Hague instrument concerning divorce 
jurisdiction. That being the case, attention must turn to the existing ‘British’ rules in the area 
of matrimonial proceedings. 
 
Divorce jurisdiction and recognition: the existing law in the U.K. 
In examining the implications of Brexit for cross-border divorce proceedings, it is useful to 
map the types of cases which are potentially affected.    
(a) Purely domestic matrimonial proceedings 
The ‘inner circle’ comprises the jurisdiction of courts in the UK in actions for divorce, judicial 
separation or nullity of marriage, the circumstances of which are internal to the legal system in 
question, e.g. where both parties to the marriage are, and always have been, resident in 
Scotland. This category of case currently falls to be determined in the first place by Brussels II 
bis, by virtue of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 (hereinafter ‘DMPA 
1973’), Part II Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Proceedings (England and Wales)41 and Part III 
Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Causes (Scotland).42 
                                                          
the Convention entered into force in the UK. For Macao the date of entry into force is 1 March 1999. The date of 
entry into force of the Convention is crucial in that, not only must the circumstances of a child’s alleged abduction 
fall within those covered by the instrument, but also the date of those circumstances must post -date the coming 
into effect of the instrument in the relevant country or countries: Kilgour v Kilgour 1987 SLT 568; and Re H 
(Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] 3 All ER 230 HL. 
39 For example,1980 Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; 
1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect 
of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. 
40 For example, 2007 Hague Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support 
and Other Forms of Family Maintenance. 
41 For England and Wales (High Court and Family Court): s 5(2)(a) and (3)(a). For detail, see L Collins (Gen ed.), 
Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), para 18R-022 et seq; and 
JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 
14th ed, 2008), p 945 et seq. 
42 For Scotland: s 7(2A) (divorce and separation in Court of Session), s 7(3A) (nullity of marriage in Court of 
Session); and s 8(2)(a) and s 8(2A)(b) (sheriff court). Special rules of shrieval jurisdiction for actions of declarator 
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The currently applicable rules for England and Scotland, respectively, are to the effect that the 
forum has jurisdiction to entertain, inter alia, an action for divorce or separation, if and only if 
(1) the English or Scottish court, respectively, has jurisdiction under Brussels II bis; or (2) the 
action is an excluded action43 (i.e. no court of a Contracting State has jurisdiction under the 
Council Regulation) and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in Scotland or 
England (as appropriate) on the date when the action is begun. 
The first point of reference, therefore, in a purely domestic divorce (i.e. having no cross-border 
factual dimension) is Brussels II bis. Even where the matrimonial action has no cross-border 
element, the putative forum first must consider if it has jurisdiction under the Regulation. In 
2001 when Brussels II came into force, many Family Law practitioners in the UK were shocked 
to find themselves being required to take account, for what they perceived to be ‘domestic’ 
Scottish or English divorces, of the complex matrix of rules set down in Brussels II, art 2, to 
be replaced shortly thereafter by Brussels II bis, art 3. Insofar as Brussels II bis has become the 
law, in England and in Scotland, to determine jurisdiction in ‘domestic’ divorces, it is necessary 
to ensure that, immediately post-Brexit, rules are in place to regulate the allocation of divorce 
jurisdiction. This result will be delivered by means of the Repeal Bill and, where necessary, 
subordinate legislation.  
(b) Intra-UK, cross-border matrimonial proceedings  
The second type of divorce case potentially affected by Brexit is the intra-UK, cross-border 
matrimonial proceeding, e.g. where, at the date of proceedings, one party to the marriage is 
habitually resident in the erstwhile matrimonial home in Scotland, and the other is habitually 
resident in England.  
The subject of the applicability of Brussels II bis intra-UK has been a matter of debate, 
particularly44 in relation to parental responsibility and related matters.45 There is no explicit 
                                                          
of marriage are contained in DMPA 1973, s 8(2ZA). For detail, see EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International 
Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W.Green, 4th edition, 2015), para 12-05.  
43 Scottish terminology: s 7(2A)(b). 
44 But not exclusively – see JKN v JCN [2010] EWHC 843 (Fam). See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, 
International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 4th edition, 2015), at para 12-16; L Collins (Gen ed), 
Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at para 18-274; and JJ 
Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th 
ed, 2008), at p 962. 
45 See, for comment, K Beevers and D McClean, ‘Intra-UK Jurisdiction in Parental Responsibility Cases: Has 
Europe Intervened’ [2005] International Family Law 129; KJ Hood, Conflict of Laws within the UK (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 5.38-5.49;  JM Scott, ‘Choice of Forum – Jurisdictional Issues within the UK’ (2007), 
paper delivered at the Advanced Family Law Conference, Law Society of Scotland; G Maher, ‘Parental 
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provision in Brussels II bis stating that a Member State having two or more legal systems shall 
not be required to apply the regulation to conflicts solely between the laws of such units. 
Absence of such provision might be said to support the inference that the provisions of Brussels 
II bis apply as between the different legal systems of the UK, but the point has been a subject 
of debate. First instance judges have reached different conclusions on the question,46 but 
opinion seems to have settled47 on the position that the instrument does not apply within the 
UK.48 This point, debated even before Brexit was within anyone’s contemplation, has been 
decided in a manner which, as things turn out, is fortuitous; there will be no legislative gap to 
fill. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU should have no bearing on the intra-UK, matrimonial 
dimension, which will remain governed by the jurisdiction allocation rules set out in DMPA 
1973. These rules include the conflicting jurisdiction rules set out for England in section 5(6) 
and Schedule 1 (Staying of Matrimonial Proceedings (England and Wales) (‘obligatory stays’), 
and for Scotland in section 11 (sisting of certain actions) and Schedule 3.8 (Sisting of 
Matrimonial Actions (Scotland) (‘mandatory stays’)), whereby, in a priority of process 
approach, a second-seised court in the UK must stay/sist an action of divorce upon evidence, 
inter alia, that an equivalent action is proceeding in a related jurisdiction within the UK. 
In terms of section 44(1) of the Family Law Act 1986, no divorce or annulment obtained in 
any part of the British Islands49 shall be regarded as effective in any part of the UK unless 
granted by a court of civil jurisdiction. Under section 44(2), subject to section 51 of the 1986 
Act, the validity of any divorce, annulment or judicial separation granted by a court of civil 
jurisdiction in any part of the British Islands shall be recognised throughout the UK.  
(c) Intra-EU, cross-border matrimonial proceedings 
                                                          
responsibility proceedings: intra UK jurisdiction and the European regulation’ 2007 SLT (News) 117-121; G 
Maher, ‘Family law proceedings and intra-UK jurisdiction’ 2008 JR 315-317; and A Inglis, ‘A Muckle Midden 
Cleared’ 2009 JR 285. 
46 Re PC, YC and KM (Brussels IIR) [2013] EWHC 2336 (Fam), per Baker J at [11].  
47 An English Local Authority v X (Child), Y (Mother), Z (Father) [2015] EWFC 89, per Peter Jackson J at [16]. 
cf the ‘orthodox view’ referred to in Re PC, YC and KM (Brussels IIR) [2013] EWHC 2336 (Fam), per Baker J at 
[11]. 
48 In a recent case, In the Matter of X (A Child), In the Matter of Y (A Child) , [2016] EWHC 2271 (Fam) the 
President of the Family Division stated plainly that Brussels II bis did not apply as between territories of the UK. 
The Inner House of the Court of Session takes the same view. In the subsequent Scottish case, Cumbria County 
Council, Petitioner [2016] CSIH 92, Lord Drummond Young stated at [15] (and see also [28]) that the Extra 
Division of the Inner House is ‘in respectful agreement with that conclusion.’ 
49 ‘British Islands’ means the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (Interpretation Act 1978, 
s 5 and Sch 1, para 1).  
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In the matrimonial arena, the most significant implications of Brexit will be felt in the matter 
of allocation of jurisdiction under Chapter II of Brussels II bis, and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments from EU Member State courts per Chapter III, e.g. where, at the 
date of proceedings, one party to the marriage is habitually resident in the erstwhile 
matrimonial home in Scotland, and the other is habitually resident in Germany. As outlined 
above,50 the first point of reference in the DMPA 1973 for matrimonial jurisdiction allocation 
in a British forum is Brussels II bis. All European Member State courts must apply the rules 
contained in art 3 of Brussels II bis, as well as the conflict of jurisdiction rule contained in 
article 19 (a lis pendens priority of process rule, which is the same in essence as the mandatory 
stay/sist rule outlined above).  
Intra-EU recognition and enforcement of divorces, legal separations and marriage annulments 
is afforded by article 21 of Brussels II bis, subject to article 22: a judgment given in one 
Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure 
being required.51 No special procedure is required to update the ‘civil-status’ records of a 
Member State on the final award of a matrimonial judgment from another Member State.  
Upon the advent of Brexit the UK will be excluded from this European system. Although it is 
envisaged that, by virtue of the Repeal Bill, Brussels II bis will ‘operate’ in the UK as part of 
the transfer of the acquis, British judgments will fall to be recognised or not in other European 
Member States only on the basis of those States’ residual national rules. European Member 
State courts will not – because they cannot – extend Brussels II bis to Third State judgments.  
(d) ‘International’ cross-border matrimonial proceedings 
The fourth type of case to be considered for Brexit implications is the international cross-border 
situation, i.e. a case where no ground of jurisdiction is available under article 3 of Brussels II 
bis. In such cases British courts revert to the residual, national rules contained in the DMPA 
1973, namely, that a court in England or Scotland shall have jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings for divorce etc only if no court of a European Member State has jurisdiction under 
                                                          
50 At [XXX]. 
51 See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 4th edition, 
2015), paras 12-37-12-40; L Collins (Gen ed), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 
15th edition, 2012), paras 18-061- 18-062 ; and JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th edition, 2008), at pp 989- 992. 
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Brussels II bis and either party to the marriage is domiciled in England and Wales or Scotland 
(as appropriate) on the date when the proceedings are begun.52  
In the event of conflicting jurisdictions between a British court and a non-EU court (e.g. where 
one spouse raises divorce proceedings in London, and the other seeks divorce in Texas, USA), 
the DMPA 1973 provides a system of rules named, for England, discretionary stays,53 and for 
Scotland, discretionary sists.54 This is a forum non conveniens system, based on 
appropriateness of forum as opposed to a priority of process rule, and is supported and 
illustrated by a significant body of case law.55 Where, before trial has begun in any matrimonial 
proceedings in a UK court, it appears that there are other proceedings relating to the marriage 
in another jurisdiction and that the balance of fairness, including convenience, between the 
parties is such that it is appropriate for those other proceedings to be disposed of before further 
steps are taken in the UK action, the court may order that the proceedings in the court be 
stayed.56 
 
As to recognition of non-EU divorces in the UK, the relevant statute is the Family Law Act 
1986,57 principally section 46. Essentially the overseas divorce must be effective where 
                                                          
52 Section 12(5)(d) provides that ‘excluded action’ means an action in respect of which no court of a Contracting 
State has jurisdiction under the Council Regulation and the defender is not a person who is– (i) a national of a 
Contracting State (other than the UK or Ireland); or (ii) domiciled in Ireland. See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, 
International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 4th edition, 2015), at para 12-11; L Collins (Gen ed), 
Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at para 18R-022; and JJ 
Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th 
edition, 2008), at p 945. 
53 L Collins (Gen ed), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at 
para 18R-268 et seq; and JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. Private International Law  
(Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at pp 959-962. 
54See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 4th edition, 
2015), at para 12-14.  
55 De Dampierre [1988] AC 92; Chai v Peng (also known as: Peng v Chai) Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
[2015] EWCA Civ 1312); Wai Foon Tan v Weng Kean Choy [2014] EWCA Civ 251. 
56 DMPA 1973, Sch 1, para 9 (England and Wales), and Sch 3, para 9 (Scotland). See R Schuz, ‘The Further 
Implications of Spiliada in Light of Recent Case Law: Stays in Matrimonial Proceedings ’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 946. 
See operation of the plea in the following (English) cases: Shemshadfard v Shemshadfard [1981] 1 All ER 726; 
De Dampierre v De Dampierre [1987] 2 All ER 1; Thyssen-Bornemisza v Thyssen-Bornemisza [1986] Fam. 1; 
Breuning v Breuning [2002] 1 FLR 888; A v S (Financial Relief after Overseas US Divorce) [2002] EWHC 1157 
(Fam); B v B (Divorce: Stay of Foreign Proceedings) [2002] EWHC 1711 (Fam); [2003] 1 FLR 1; O v O (Appeal 
against Stay: Divorce Petition) [2003] 1 FLR 192; T v M-T [2005] EWHC 79 (Fam); Ella v Ella [2007] EWCA 
Civ 99; M v M [2010] EWHC 982 (Fam); AB v CB (Divorce and Maintenance: Discretion to Stay) (also known 
as Mittal v Mittal) [2014] Fam 102; and Chai v Peng [2015] Fam Law 37. 
57 The Family Law Act 1986 repealed in toto the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, but to 
a large extent replicated (and expanded to include recognition of foreign annulments) the provisions of the 1971 
Act, which itself was passed to implement in the UK the 1970 Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces 
and Legal Separations. There are 20 Contracting States to the 1970 Convention, including among them some, but 
not all, EU Member States.   
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obtained; and there must be a personal law connection between the issuing court and one or 
both parties (depending on the nature of the divorce as ‘proceedings’ or ‘non-proceedings’), by 
virtue of domicile, habitual residence or nationality.58  
In the matter of recognition of a British divorce in a non-EU Member State, the parties are at 
the whim of the foreign legal system’s own recognition rules, and limping status is always a 
risk.   
 
The implications of the Repeal Bill for cross-border matrimonial proceedings 
The Repeal Bill will have the effect of converting directly applicable EU law into UK law. 
What is the import of this for the area of law under discussion? The effect of the UK 
Government’s strategy is that a domesticated, EU-derived version of Brussels II bis will 
(purportedly) continue to apply in UK law until legislators in the UK decide otherwise.59 
Insofar as European instruments create unilateral obligations, it is meaningful to say that the 
acquis will be converted into domestic law. Reciprocity is not necessary in relation to the 
operation of certain private law instruments, such as the Rome I60 and II61 Regulations. With 
regard to such instruments, the UK can act unilaterally since the agreement of other Member 
States or European institutions is not required in order to adopt the terms of such instruments 
autonomously into British law, or to operate them. Technically, the jurisdiction allocation 
provisions contained in article 3 of Brussels II bis are unilateral in nature, and there should be 
no bar, therefore, on UK courts continuing to apply such rules. However, to apply article 3 in 
isolation from its ancillary lis pendens rule in article 19 (which rests upon mutuality) produces 
a skewed result insofar as the Brussels scheme envisages the jurisdiction allocation rules and 
the lis pendens rule to be part of a single scheme. With regard to bilateral or reciprocal private 
international law arrangements, it is meaningless, indeed delusional, to say that the UK shall 
convert the acquis into British law. 
                                                          
58 See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 4th edition, 
2015), at paras 12-28 – 12-32; L Collins (Gen ed), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at para 18R-063; and JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. 
Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at p 992  et seq.  
59 March 2017 White Paper, para 2.8. 
60 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L 177, 4 July 2008, pp 6–16. 
61 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L 199, 31 July 2007, pp 40–49. 
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Unilateral conversion cannot bring about the required reciprocity or mutuality that lies at the 
heart of the Brussels regime. While, in the event of conflicting matrimonial proceedings in a 
British court and a European Member State court, a second-seised court in the UK might be 
prepared, through operation of article 19 of Brussels II bis (or a nationalised, EU-derived 
version thereof) to defer to an earlier-seised French court, the converse would not necessarily 
apply.62 Likewise, a British court might be willing, through operation of article 21 of Brussels 
II bis (or domesticated version thereof) to recognise and enforce without question a French 
judgment, but there would be no obligation on a French court to reciprocate vis-à-vis a British 
decree. The Brussels scheme of rules is couched in the language of ‘other Member State’, and 
without express agreement between the UK and the European Union, other European Member 
State courts will be unable, post-Brexit, to extend the operation of Brussels II bis to conflicting, 
concurrent proceedings in the UK, or to judgments emanating from a British court.63 
The Government’s March 2017 White Paper acknowledges the fact of loss of reciprocity, 
noting that, ‘A significant amount of EU-derived law, even when converted into domestic law, 
will not achieve its desired legal effect in the UK once we have left the EU.’64 Action will be 
needed to ensure continuing effectiveness.65 Although the Government recognises the problem, 
there is no indication in its White Paper, nor in the evidence which the Minister of State for 
Courts and Justice gave to the House of Lords European Union Committee,66 about how the 
continuing effectiveness of ‘EU law’ is to be secured. The mere reiteration on UK statute books 
of European measures cannot facilitate the operation of significant proportions of EU/EU-
derived law.67 Since the Repeal Bill cannot deliver reciprocity, only the negotiation process 
can work to supply the lack.  
 
The post-Brexit regulation of cross-border matrimonial proceedings  
There is an immediate threat to the legal services market in the UK, at least on the civil and 
commercial side, from the current lack of certainty.68 Uncertainty creates anxiety and the 
                                                          
62 It might apply by dint of residual national rules on conflicting jurisdictions. 
63 Though as in n 62, above, the operation of residual national rules might result in recognition. 
64 March 2017 White Paper, para 1.14. 
65 Ibid, para 3.2. 
66 Evidence of The Rt Hon Sir Oliver Heald QC, Minister of State for Courts and Justice, Ministry of Justice, 
(http://www.parliament.uk/brexit-civil-justice-cooperation/), Qs 38 - 46. 
67 March 2017 White Paper, para 3.5. 
68 House of Lords Committee Report, para 40. 
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danger is that parties who use the UK legal services market will take their business elsewhere. 
The ‘macro’ aim of the British Government in its Brexit negotiations is to avoid the UK’s 
sustaining political and economic harm, but there is, or at least should be, a ‘micro’ aim of 
avoiding harm being sustained by the legal profession and the legal services infrastructure in 
the UK.   
In the matrimonial and family law sphere, as in the civil and commercial law arena, identity of 
forum is highly significant, and the matter of portability of judgments throughout Europe and 
the rest of the world (and, in the family law context, universality of status) of great 
importance.69  
It is imperative that there is certainty as to the immediate, post-Brexit state of the law. 
Adequate, ‘fit for purpose’ rules must be available with regard to matrimonial jurisdiction and 
judgment recognition to avoid the problem of limping status. It is likely that there will be a 
deadline of spring 2019 for finalising the withdrawal agreement, which will encompass 
disentangling the UK from the EU treaties, and securing an orderly Brexit. But a longer period 
of time is likely to be required in order to finalise arrangements for the future relationship 
between the UK and the European Union.  
Moreover, if the short-term solution is to be different from the ultimate position, there will be 
a need for interim, transitional arrangements to regulate matters until the so-called ‘landing 
zone’ is reached. There will be difficult transitional problems, e.g. what solution should be 
adopted in the event that a French court, following withdrawal by the UK, is required to decide 
a question of recognition of a Scottish divorce handed down prior to withdrawal? 
The March 2017 White Paper envisages a ‘holding position’, noting that European law will 
‘continue to apply until legislators in the UK decide otherwise’.70 The remainder of this paper 
debates the question whether or not, in the mid to long term, it would be wise for the UK 
Government to seek to negotiate with the European Union a special arrangement regarding the 
operation of Brussels II bis in the context of wider negotiations concerning the portfolio of 
European measures introduced sub nom judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. 
Can Brussels II bis (and other judicial cooperation measures) be extended to apply as among 
EU Member States and a country which, post-Brexit, will be a Third State? For cross-border 
                                                          
69 See, in civil and commercial law, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series Paper, ‘Factors Influencing Litigants’ 
Decisions to Bring Commercial Claims to the London Based Courts’ (2015), at p  15. 
70 March 2017 White Paper, para 2.8. 
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matrimonial proceedings, there is an alternative, namely, the authorisation by the Westminster 
Parliament and, where appropriate, by devolved administrations, of use by British courts of the 
‘non-EU’ rules of private international law currently applicable in ‘non-EU cases’, or a 
modernised version thereof. The merits and demerits of these opposing solutions are explored 
below, through the device of an imaginary dialogue between Pallas Athene71 and Boadicea.72  
 
Boadicea. I take the part of advocate for the clean-break from the European Union, confident 
that the rules of jurisdiction and recognition outlined for use in international (i.e. non-EU) 
cross-border matrimonial proceedings will amply supply a set of rules sufficient for the new 
post-Brexit situation, cleaving to the argument that in matters of divorce, the legal systems of 
England and Scotland can, and should, cope without the Brussels regime or any copycat version 
of it. 
Pallas Athene. I put forward the view that the UK has benefitted greatly from the rules 
contained in Brussels II bis. It provides a clear, rapid, refine-able system, admittedly civilian 
in nature, to regulate matters of jurisdiction, including conflicts of jurisdiction, and to guarantee 
mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments intra-EU. It is in the interests of the UK and 
the European Union to seek to maintain a variant of the Brussels system, as near as possible to 
the existing framework. Achieving a bilateral agreement between the UK and the European 
Union, similar to that currently in place among EU Member States, must be the objective.  
Reciprocity is crucial, and operates to the great mutual benefit of the citizens and denizens of 
all European Member States. Due appreciation of this shared advantage will assist negotiations. 
Think not only of the 1.2 million UK citizens living elsewhere in the European Union, but also 
of the 3 million citizens of other European Union Member States living in the UK.  
The Repeal Bill, we have been told, will have three primary elements.  
 
‘First, it will repeal the European Communities Act 1972, and in so doing, return power 
to UK politicians and institutions. Second, the Bill will preserve EU law where it stands 
at the moment before we leave the EU. Parliament (and, where appropriate, the 
                                                          
71 Greek goddess of reason, wisdom, intelligence and skill, renowned as a great tactician and strategist.   
72 Or Boudica, queen of the British Celtic Iceni tribe who led an uprising against the occupying forces of the 
Roman Empire in c AD 60.  
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devolved legislatures) will then be able to decide which elements of that law to keep, 
amend or repeal once we have left the EU. The UK courts will then apply those 
decisions of Parliament and the devolved legislatures. Finally, the Bill will enable 
changes to be made by secondary legislation to the laws that would otherwise not 
function sensibly once we have left the EU, so that our legal system continues to 
function correctly outside the EU.’73 
 
It is essential to secure certainty and stability, and the best way to achieve this, in the first 
instance, is to preserve European law by converting it into domestic law, and thereby to ensure 
that all European laws continues to be directly applicable in the UK. In the immediate post-
Brexit aftermath, continuity is important for families. On Brexit Day + 1, we must have in place 
a body of rules which will confer jurisdiction on UK courts. Importing Brussels II bis into 
British law, by transfer of the acquis communitaire under the Repeal Bill, so that it continues 
to exist, from a British point of view at least, is the first step. As the Government has indicated, 
‘It will be open to Parliament in the future to keep or change these laws.’74 
B. Brussels II bis can continue to exist on paper, and so far as any unilateral provision or 
obligation is concerned. Brussels II bis can be carried over, but that exercise is futile so far as 
the instrument depends on mutuality and membership of a club, of which the UK will no longer 
be a member on Brexit Day + 1.   
While courts in the UK might be prepared on a Brussels II bis principle to recognise without 
question a French decree of divorce, there would be no obligation on French courts to 
reciprocate vis-à-vis an English or Scots decree.75 Indeed other Member States will not be able, 
post-Brexit, to extend the operation of the regulation to judgments emanating from courts in 
the UK.  
PA. That’s why it is right to ensure ongoing effectiveness of the current reciprocal system by 
seeking to negotiate an agreement with the European Union parallel to Brussels II bis (or future 
                                                          
73 Government White Paper, ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’ 
Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt Hon David Davis MP (CM 9417) (2 February 2017), p 
10. See, subsequently, The Queen’s Speech and Associated Background Briefing on the Occasion of the Opening 
of Parliament on Wednesday 21 June 2017, Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech to Both Houses of Parliament, 
Wednesday 21 June 2017, at pp 17–18. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Though as stated at n 63, above, the operation of residual national rules might result in recognition.  
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recast version). Our aim must be for the UK Government to strike with the European Union a 
bilateral agreement to secure a ‘package’, encompassing the Brussels portfolio in commercial 
law76 and in family law77 and in matters of procedure.78 For the purpose of our immediate 
discourse, however, let the arguments be restricted to matrimonial proceedings. 
B. But Prime Minister Theresa May has declared that the UK is,    
 
‘… taking control of our own affairs, as those who voted in their millions to leave the 
European Union demanded we must. So we will take back control of our laws and bring 
an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain. Leaving the 
European Union will mean that our laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, 
Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg 
but in courts across this country. Because we will not have truly left the European Union 
if we are not in control of our own laws.’79 
 
To negotiate a bespoke arrangement, which is a fairly close copy of the Brussels regime, is a 
cheat on the British people, and unacceptable politically. The British people will find it hard to 
understand why the Government is actively seeking cooperation with the European Union, 
while at the same time seeking to escape European legal domination.  
PA. If the British people knew what was good for them legally at a time of marital upset, they 
would fight to keep a version of Brussels II bis. There is a need for a tailor-made UK-EU 
agreement which will secure the same end. Although it might be naïve to imagine that matters 
of private international law will have a high political priority in the withdrawal negotiation, 
                                                          
76 In relation to jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, Brussels I Recast and its progeny, including Regulation 
861/2007 creating a European small claims procedure [2007] OJ L199/1; and Regulation 805/2004 creating a 
European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims [2004] OJ L143/15; and Regulation 1896/2006 creating a 
European order for payment procedure [2006] OJ L399/1. In relation to choice of law, R ome I and Rome II.  
77 Brussels II bis, and Council Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1.  
78 E.g. matters covered by Regulation 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the 
taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters [2001] OJ L174/1, and Regulation 1393/2007 on the service in 
the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [2007] OJ L324/79 
(replacing Regulation 1348/2000 [2000] OJ L160/37). 
79 Lancaster House speech (17 January 2017), setting out the UK Government’s plan for the Brexit negotiations; 
Section 2 (‘Control of our own laws’) (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-
objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech). 
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cross-border legal disputes are inevitable in business and family matters alike, and the Minister 
of State for Courts and Justice, Sir Oliver Heald, has confirmed that the content of Brussels II 
bis will ‘form part of the forthcoming Brexit negotiations’.80 Likewise, the House of Lords 
European Union Committee has urged the Government to ‘keep as close to these rules as 
possible when negotiating their post-Brexit application.’81 Given commercial priorities, 
however, it is probable that the commercial law agenda will lead, and family law follow.   
Let an agreement be struck, whereby the essence of Brussels II bis (or recast, as appropriate) 
can operate among Member States of the European Union and the UK. The model can be the 
EC/Denmark Agreement,82 which extended as between the European Community and 
Denmark the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation,83 with certain amendments of a fairly 
minor nature. 
B. But the EC/Denmark Agreement relates only to instruments concerning civil and 
commercial law. There is no counterpart agreement for family law; there has been no 
agreement to extend the operation of Brussels II bis to relations between the European Union 
and Denmark.  
PA. If there is negotiating will, something akin to the Agreement could be drafted of new to 
operate in matrimonial matters.  
B. But there’s a snag. In her Lancaster House speech, Prime Minister Theresa May said that, 
for the future, we ‘will … bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in 
Britain.’84  
                                                          
80 See House of Lords Committee Report reference to evidence of the Rt Hon Sir Oliver Heald QC MP, Minister 
of State for Courts and Justice, Ministry of Justice, at para 83. 
81 House of Lords Committee Report, para 23; cf House of Commons Committee Report, para 25. 
82 Agreement between the European Community and Denmark on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2005] OJ L299/62.  
83 Council Regulation (EC) No.44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (OJ L12, 16 January 2001). See further Council of the European Union Press Release 
8402/06 (re Luxembourg meeting, April 2006), noting agreement concerning the extension to Denmark of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Decision 6922/06); and The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/ 
1655). In terms of art 3.2 of the EC-Denmark Agreement, whenever amendments were adopted to the Brussels I 
Regulation, Denmark was required to notify the Commission of its decision whether or not to implement the 
content of such amendments. By letter of 20 December 2012 Denmark notified the Commission of its decision to 
implement the contents of Brussels I Recast, and so the recast regulation applies to relations between the EU and 
Denmark (Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L79/4, 21 March 2013). 
84 Lancaster House speech (17 January 2017), setting out the UK Government’s plan for the Brexit negotiations; 
Section 2 (‘Control of our own laws’) (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-
objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech). 
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The UK Government has assured us that, ‘The Great Repeal Bill will not provide any role for 
the CJEU in the interpretation of [such new law as may be passed post-Brexit by the UK and 
devolved legislatures], and the Bill will not require the domestic courts to consider the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence.’85  
Admittedly, the position is not as clear cut as might at first appear: for reasons of certainty and 
continuity the UK Government accepts that, ‘Everyone will have been operating on the basis 
that the law means what the CJEU has already determined it does, and any other starting point 
would be to change the law.86 …  [T]he Bill will provide that historic CJEU case law be given 
the same binding, or precedent, status in our courts as decisions of our own Supreme Court.’87  
 
CJEU case law, as it exists on Brexit Day, will continue to be relevant in British courts. But 
this will not infringe the autonomy of the UK Supreme Court for it may treat historic decisions 
of the CJEU as being subject to the same rule as was adopted in the Practice Statement of the 
House of Lords in 1966, to the effect that, ‘while treating its former decisions as normally 
binding, it will depart from its previous decisions “when it appears right to do so”.’88 
With regard to the negotiation of any agreement between the European Union and the UK on 
the portfolio of Brussels instruments, or any single instrument, the conceding, or not, for the 
future, of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is likely to 
be a major stumbling block. 
PA. On an EC/Denmark Agreement model, the great benefit would be that the UK would be 
required, when interpreting the agreement, only to take ‘due account of’ the rulings contained 
in CJEU case law. In considering how much respect must be accorded to CJEU interpretative 
jurisprudence, article 6.2 of the EC/Denmark Agreement is a useful template: 
Article 6 Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in relation 
to the interpretation of the Agreement  
…  
                                                          
85 March 2017 White Paper, para 2.13. 
86 March 2017 White Paper, para 2.15. 
87 March 2017 White Paper, para 2.16. 
88 Ibid. 
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2. Under Danish law, the courts in Denmark shall, when interpreting this Agreement, 
take due account of the rulings contained in the case law of the Court of Justice in 
respect of provisions of the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation and any 
implementing Community measures.89 
Alternatively, one can look to the Lugano II Convention90 as the guide, namely, the 2007 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland, the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Denmark.91  
With regard to interpretation of Lugano II, the wording in the Lugano model is similar, but not 
identical, to the EC/Denmark Agreement model. Article 1 of Protocol 2 on the Uniform 
Interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee92 provides that any court 
applying and interpreting Lugano II shall pay due account to the principles laid down by any 
relevant decision upon the Lugano I or II Conventions, and the Brussels I Regulation and 
amendments thereof, rendered by the courts of Lugano Contracting States and by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities.   
With regard to any bilateral UK-EU Agreement in relation to the Brussels portfolio of 
instruments, use of the words ‘due account’ would afford a measure of discretion to UK courts 
to decline to follow decisions of the CJEU. Paying ‘due account’ leaves open a window of 
opportunity for a British court to examine a CJEU decision, but decide to disregard it. 
B. ‘Due account’? Weasel words. While ‘due account’ may provide an escape route, why 
should the European Union negotiators, all of whose Member States’ legal systems are required 
to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the CJEU and are bound by its decisions, accept a 
                                                          
89 Emphasis added. 
90 A parallel scheme of rules of jurisdiction and judgment enforcement was brought into force for the European 
Free Trade Association area (comprising, for the instant purposes, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; the 
principality of Liechtenstein, an EFTA Contracting State, did not ratify the Lugano I or II Conventions) by the 
1988 Lugano (‘Parallel’) Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, which was extended to operate in the UK by means of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991.  
Lugano II replaces the 1988 Lugano Convention in terms which, in general, are parallel to those contained in the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
91 Signed on behalf of the European Community on 30 October 2007. See Decision 2007/712/EC on the signing, 
on behalf of the Community, of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters [2007] OJ L339/1; and Decision 2009/430/EC concerning the conclusion of the 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
[2009] OJ L147/1. See also Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, as amended by the Civil Jurisdiction  and 
Judgments Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/3131). 
92 Protocol 2 on the uniform interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee (OJ L339/27) (21  
December 2007). 
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special UK position in relation to interpretation? One can’t leave a club, and stop paying 
membership subscriptions, and expect to retain benefits better than those who continue as 
members of the club. 
PA. Looking to the future, a UK-EU Agreement would be a new arrangement. As far as 
interpretation is concerned, it is in the nature of things that European regulations are interpreted 
differently in different Member States; rules are composed of words, not mathematical 
formulae.  
B. On that point, if there is no overarching court having mandatory jurisdiction, how far and 
how quickly would a British version of Brussels II bis (either a domesticated, EU-derived 
version, applicable from Brexit Day in terms of the Repeal Bill, or a renegotiated version in 
terms of a UK-EU Agreement) diverge from the instrument as known and interpreted among 
European Member States? Such divergence, over time, may make a Brussels II bis simulacrum 
increasingly less valuable as its common core weakens. 
PA. If the UK Government adheres strongly to its view that the CJEU can exercise no oversight 
on the interpretation and development of principles of law in this area, this will cut down 
negotiating options, for some degree of CJEU oversight of interpretation is likely to be a red 
line for negotiators for the European Union.93   
B. But when the UK leaves the European Union, there will be no UK judge on the CJEU to 
influence interpretation. Why should the UK hitch itself to a wagon without knowing where, 
or being able to control where, that wagon is going?94 There is no need for a system with an 
overarching court. Systems of international regulation created by the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law do not have such a court.   
Let me put the case for the alternative. The UK will have some sort of solution on Brexit Day 
+ 1 in the form of a domesticated, lop-sided version of Brussels II bis (or Recast) applicable in 
UK law. But I contend that the medium and long-term aim is to strive for a bolder, more 
satisfactory solution, untrammelled by CJEU jurisdiction and Brussels-inspired rules.  
                                                          
93 Cf House of Lords Committee Report, para 142. 
94 Cf Evidence of Patrick Robinson, Partner, Linklaters LLP, to House of Commons Justice Committee during 
evidence session on 20 December 2016 regarding investigation into ‘Implications of Brexit for the Justice 
System’. 
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As regards matrimonial jurisdiction of the English and Scottish courts, the currently applicable, 
residual national rules of jurisdiction could apply in all cases, to the (simple) effect that a Scots 
or English forum would have jurisdiction to entertain an action for divorce or separation, if 
either party to the marriage is domiciled in Scotland or England (as appropriate) on the date 
when the action is begun.95 
PA. That would reduce the opportunities for parties to have their proceedings heard in the UK, 
an outcome which would be regrettable from the perspective of many litigants; easy access to 
British courts is advantageous for many parties. Brussels II bis offers, through article 3, seven 
potential bases of jurisdiction. It would be a retrograde step to revert to using ‘domicile’ as the 
connecting factor, and more so as the sole connecting factor. Retaining multiple bases of 
jurisdiction will safeguard the legal services market in the UK. 
B. It will help the legal services market in London, but will it bring much business to other 
parts of the country? Some of the family law issues which Brexit raises concern the position of 
London as a pre-eminent forum in divorce litigation. As far as Scotland is concerned, why have 
seven grounds of jurisdiction, with overlap among them, when there could be a more 
straightforward, streamlined approach? It is desirable to simplify the rules of jurisdiction.  
I admit that confining jurisdiction to cases where one party at least is domiciled in England or 
Scotland would restrict jurisdiction options from the parties’ points of view, and would reduce 
business in the British courts. I might even concede that, since prior to the coming into effect 
of Brussels II bis, the rule in UK courts was based upon either party’s domicile in the putative 
jurisdiction, or on his/her having been habitually resident there for a period of one year 
immediately prior to the date on which the action was begun,96 and since UK courts now are 
very familiar with the concept of ‘habitual residence’, a more contemporary approach than 
adherence to the tool of domicile might be the adoption as the relevant connecting factor of 
habitual residence of either party in Scotland or England on the date when the action is begun. 
But I hold to my contention that loss of article 3 of Brussels II bis would be no real loss; the 
Regulation, and article 3 in particular, have been subject to legitimate criticism.97 
                                                          
95 DMPA 1973, Part II Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Proceedings (England and Wales) and Part III Jurisdiction in 
Matrimonial Causes (Scotland). See p XX [Purely domestic matrimonial proceedings], above. 
96 EB Crawford, International Private Law (W Green, 1st edition, 1998), at para 10.07; L Collins (Gen ed), Dicey 
& Morris on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th edition, 2000), at para 18R-001 et seq. 
97 See for example EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective (W Green, 
4th edition, 2015), at paras 12-07-12-10; L Collins (Gen ed), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (Sweet 
& Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at paras 18-005-18-006; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & 
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Bear in mind the problem of conflicting jurisdiction. As a result of the UK’s being subsumed 
into a civilian-inspired system, British judges have had to become attuned to a system of 
priority of process,98 while being uneasy about the impact of such a mechanical rule upon the 
subtleties of resolving inter-spousal disputes. This is an opportunity to abandon the rule of ‘first 
come, first served’, and revert to a system of adjudication in the most appropriate forum.   
PA. The lis pendens rule is straightforward and clear, and easy for parties to understand and 
judges to apply. 
B. There is a veneer of clarity, but difficult interpretative issues have arisen.99 Better by far to 
apply to the resolution of all cases of conflicting jurisdiction the exercise of judicial discretion 
in the award of a discretionary stay or sist, in the manner of the House of Lords in De 
Dampierre v De Dampierre,100 where acceptance of the plea of forum non conveniens delivered 
a fair solution.  
PA. A fair solution, but only after an expensive and lengthy litigation. One can expect many 
more cross-border conflicts of jurisdiction than were met with in the 1980s because of the 
increase in international families and international family break-up. The family court system 
in England would not be able to cope with the expected increase in volume and complexity of 
litigation.101 Another thought is that the national, residual private international law rules of 
most EU Member States in the matter of conflicting, concurrent matrimonial proceedings will 
be a lis pendens rule not a forum non conveniens rule. The UK ought to align with that 
approach.  
B. Turning to the recognition of overseas foreign divorces, there is no reason why the UK 
should not apply, in all cases, the rules currently used in non-EU, cross-border matrimonial 
proceedings. Recognition of divorces emanating from EU Member State courts, in future, 
                                                          
Fawcett. Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at p 946; and M Ni Shuilleabhain, 
Cross-Border Divorce Law Brussels II bis (Oxford University Press, 2010), ch 1. 
98 Art 19, Brussels II bis. 
99 See for example C v S (Divorce: Jurisdiction) [2010] EWHC 2676 (Fam); H v W (divorce; jurisdiction) [2010] 
All ER (D) 70 (Sep); S v S (Brussels II Revised: Articles 19(1) and (3): Reference to ECJ)  [2014] EWHC 3613 
(Fam); [2015] Fam. Law 130; Jefferson v O’Connor [2014] EWCA Civ 38; and Ville de Bauge v China [2014] 
EWHC 3975 (Fam). See EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective 
(W.Green, 4th edition, 2015), at para 12-15; L Collins (Gen ed.), Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 15th edition, 2012), at para 18-273; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett. 
Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 2008), at pp 957 – 958. 
100 [1988] AC 92. 
101 House of Lords Committee Report, para 136; cf Bar Council Brexit Working Group, Brexit Papers – Paper 
Six: Family Law, paras 8 and 9. 
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would be best regulated by the Family Law Act 1986, section 46, with the content of which 
essentially ‘pro-recognition’ rules there has never been serious complaint.  
PA. The system of recognition incorporated in the 1986 Act is a unilateral system. It cannot 
provide for the recognition by European Member State courts of a British decree; recognition 
would depend on each Member State’s own residual, national rules. At present, mutual 
recognition delivers uniformity of marital status across Europe. Portability of judgments – the 
‘export’ of British orders – is very important in family law and is an inestimable benefit of the 
Brussels system.   
B. In practice a decree emanating from the domicile of one or both parties (or, were the 
connecting factor to be modernised, from either party’s habitual residence) would be likely to 
be recognised by other European Member State courts given the strong connection between a 
party and a forum which domicile constitutes.  
PA. Our positions are opposed; agreeing to differ will not advance matters. We are at one in 
our desire to achieve the best outcome in private international law terms for parties engaged in 
cross-border matrimonial disputes. We may attempt to read the runes, but at this juncture we 
are necessarily equally ignorant of the outcome of the political machinations, and can but 
speculate.  
 
Epilogue  
The authors, adopting the role of narrators, and looking to the future relationship between the 
UK and the European Union in judicial co-operation in private international law matters, hope 
that the UK Government, using the strategic wisdom and skill of Pallas Athene, will be 
successful in securing a solution whereby the observable, reciprocal benefits of the 
Europeanisation of private international law – generally, and in the specific context under 
discussion in this article – can be retained. If such a solution is beyond reach because of 
negotiating ‘red lines’ such as UK refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the CJEU, may the 
spirit of Boadicea imbue the UK Government and, where appropriate, the devolved 
legislatures, with the resolve to fashion a system of rules based on established law apt for the 
new circumstances.   
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